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S.1 Cappadocian View of Personhood and Edwardsian Free Will
S.2 Greek/Arian/Nestorian View of Personhood and Edwardsian Free Will
For Trinitarian theology to be true, there must be a distinction between person and nature (n/p). Nature is the what/essence. Person is the who/irreducible subjectivity present with a rational essence. A reality with the nature, which gives the nature it’s grounding in reality or concreteness. This is the Cappadocian position. On S.1 you have the nature/person distinction but a passive person. But then person cannot truly be called a subject. On S.2 you have a collapse of nature and person and but the person can be said to be active and still the subject. If the n/p distinction is to be up held, and agents are active, it must assume that these agents qua persons have inherent causal power to break away from the determined path of previous events. In other words the origination of motion in choice is not grounded in their essences but personhood. The free will of Active Persons and Alternative Possibilities. This type of free will is the libertarian kind, which requires alternative possibilities as real open options for the future. Or one could deny alternative possibility as necessary at all but that still doesn’t help the situation, Here for the good to be maximally great, it must depend on evil. God then either determines a world of evil by necessity of his nature, his glory depends on it, or he prefers it. Sure, one could hold to that. But so much for sovereign grace and God’s aseity.